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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
FRANK TAYLOR and MARGARET S. 
GARNER, d/b/a FRANK TAYLOR 
AND GARNER, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
vs. 
LEE L. DAHL, 
Defendant and Appellant, 
PETER W. HUMMEL, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
Case No. 
9119 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Respondent disagrees with the Statement of Facts set 
forth by the Appellants and therefore invites the court's atten-
tion to the evidence and record in the following particulars. 
For purposes of convenience, Plaintiffs and Appellants 
will hereinafter be referred to as Garner, and Defendants 
and Appellant Lee L. Dahl, will hereinafter be referred to as 
Dahl and Respondent will be referred to as Hummel. 
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Garner brought an action below against Dahl for a claimed 
real estate commission. She joined Hummel in the action and 
admits that she has held $10,000.00 deposited by him in con-
nection with a claimed sale of real property. Garner alleged 
she was entitled to $3,750.00 as real estate commission and 
asked, in addition thereto, for attorneys fees. She deposited 
$6,250.00 with the court, stating that the court should deter-
mine the respective claims of herself, Dahl and Hummel and 
order the last sum paid to such parties as the court should 
determine were entitled to it (R. 1, 2 & 3). 
Garner claimed she was entitled to the commission and 
attorneys fees by reason of an alleged contract attached to 
the Complaint (R. 4). 
Hummel admitted he had deposited $10,000.00 with 
Garner and that his signatures on the alleged contract were 
genuine but claimed he was entitled to the return of his money 
and that the claims of Garner and Dahl were without right 
(R. 5 & 6). 
By way of counterclaim, Hummel contended that the de-
posit was made with the understanding that plans and specifi-
cations detailing the finish work to be done, were to have been 
procured and agreed upon and attached to the alleged contract. 
He contended that no satisfactory plans and specifications 
were ever procured and the alleged contract shows upon its face 
that no ·agreement had ever been reached by the parties (R. 
6 & 7). 
To the Complaint Dahl answered and counterclaimed 
agreeing with Garner's contention that a contract had been 
entered into by himself and Hummel, but claiming that he 
-,~ 
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was alone entitled to the $10,000.00, plus $5,000.00 punitive 
damages and attorneys fees (R. 9-12). 
Dahl also cross-complained against Hummel, claiming 
the $10,000.00 as liquidated damages, $3,000.00 additional 
damages and $2,500.00 attorneys fees (R. 17-19). 
To this cross-complaint, Hummel :filed his Answer (R. 
21-23). Various defenses were set up, but the only one before 
the court in this appeal was that "the initial proposal that plans 
and specifications for the completion of said home and premises 
never came about, nor was any agreement reached with respect 
thereto; that this agreement was a specific condition precedent 
to said written document; that the two Defendants at no time 
have had a meeting of the minds and no contract has ever 
been entered into by and between said parties" (R. 23). 
The depositions of Dahl, Garner and Hummel were taken 
and are a part of the record on appeal. After the pre-trial con-
ference, all parties filed motions for summary judgment, which 
were fully argued, and the court granted counsel on both sides 
alleged contract attached to Plaintiff's Complaint entitled him 
to judgment as a matter of law. The contentions of the parties 
were fully argued, and th court granted counsel on both sides 
an opportunity to submit briefs. After due consideration, the 
court denied the motions of Garner and Dahl and granted 
the motion for summary judgment of Defendant Hummel (R. 
30). Thereafter, Garner and Dahl filed their Notice of Appeal 
to the Supreme Court from the summary judgment entered in 
favor of Hummel. They have not appealed from the order 
of the court below denying their motions for summary judg-
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ment (R. 31) . The judgment rendered by the court was made 
upon the pleadings, depositions and exhibits. 
In the Appellants' Brief, the court's attention has been 
directed to certain portions of the depositions on file in this 
case. Respondents also desire to call the court's attention to 
certain significant portions of the depositions of the parties 
and will adopt the method used in citing the depositions which 
was used in the Appellant's Brief, to-wit: 
Margaret S. Garner will be cited as "G," followed by the 
page reference; Peter W. Hummel will be cited as "H," fol-
lowed by the page reference, and Lee L. Dahl will be cited 
as "D," followed by the page reference. 
In the latter part of October or the first part of November, 
1958, Hummel contacted Garner for the purpose of having 
her assist him in finding a home in Salt Lake City. After some 
investigation of various homes, they looked at the home in 
question, situated at 5834 Brentwood Drive, Salt Lake City, 
Utah. When Hummel met Dahl for the first time, Hummel 
asked Dahl for the plans and specifications on the home. At 
pages 22 and 23 of the deposition of Dahl, we find the follow-
ing questions and answers: 
"Q. Was any request made for plans and specifications 
at that time? 
"A. Yes. 
"Q. Did Mr. Hummel make any request of you for 
plans and specifications then, speaking of your 
first meeting? 
"A. If I can remember the conversation, it was some-
thing like this: 
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He said, 'Do you have any plans and spec's for 
this?' 
I said, 'I have got somewhat of a set of plans. 
They are not complete because I have never plan-
ned on selling the home . . . ' 
He then said he would like to have some spec's 
and plans. I told him I would draw up a set of 
spec's and furnish him a set of plans I already 
had." 
After the alleged contract sued upon had been signed by 
Hummel, Garner obtained the signature of Dahl and asked 
that he prepare a set of specifications (G. 23-24). He then pre-
pared some 15 pages of form specifications as set forth in Exhibit 
"D-4," attached to the Deposition of Dahl. These were signed 
by him and delivered by Garner to Hummel with the request 
that he sign the same. Hummel at that time indicated 
his unwillingness to sign the proposed specifications for the 
reason that he had not even read them (G. 36). It is admitted 
that he has at no time ever signed or accepted these writings 
and has refused to sign and deliver them back. 
As to the plans at page 18 of Mrs. Garner's deposition, 
we find the following questions and answers: 
"Q. Now Mrs. Garner, we come to the part of the 
transaction as it pertains to the plans and specifi-
cations. Were there any plans of this property ever 
furnished to you by Mr. Dahl ? 
"A. No, the blueprint plans if that is what you mean. 
"Q. Yes, drawing that we commonly know in the 
construction buildings as plans that would show 
a diagram and so on of the building, either built 
or to be built. 
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"A. No. 
"Q. Have you ever seen any plans? 
"A. The only blueprints I have seen are the kitchen 
blueprints and bathroom blueprints. 
"Q. But not of the house itself? 
"A. No. 
"Q. I suppose it is your testimony that you have never 
furnished any of this type of document to Mr. 
Hummel? 
"A. I have never seen any. 
"Q. And from that, I assume that you have never fur-
nished any to Mr. Hummel, would that be cor-
rect? 
"A. How could I furnish them if I hadn't seen them? 
"Q. I understand. I just wanted to make the record 
clear. I assume from that, that you have never 
furnished them? 
"A. If I have never seen them, I couldn't have." 
It is nowhere contended in any of the testimony or in any 
place of the pleadings that any plans of any sort were fur-
nished to Hummel or that any plans have ever been attached 
to the alleged contract being sued upon. 
The pre-trial order entered by the court frames certain 
issues to be resolved at the time of the trial. However, at the 
pre-trial conference, all parties stated they wished to have a 
hearing before the trial date on each of their respective mo-
tions for summary judgment. No objections were made by 
either party to the hearing of the court on the legal sufficiency 
of the documents and writings and no contention was ever 
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made by the Appellants to the court below; that the issue 
of the legal sufficiency of the alleged contract could not be 
heard on the motion for the summary judgment, for the reason 
that it was outside of the pre-trial order or otherwise. 
The various motions were fully argued and written briefs 
were submitted and the court entered its summary judgment 
in favor of the Defendant Hummel. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
In connection with this appeal, Respondent contends: 
1. The court properly held as a matter of law that Re-
spondent Peter W. Hummel was entitled to a summary judg-
ment: 
A. As a matter of law, the alleged contract, entitled 
"Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase," is not a 
binding contract upon the parties. 
B. Any issue of fact between the parties as to whether 
there was a misrepresentation in connection with the 
purported agreement is not before this court because no 
binding contract existed between the parties as a matter 
of law. 
C. There is no question of fact to be determined 
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ARGUMENT 
Point 1. 
The court properly held as a_ matter of law that Respondent 
Peter W. Hummel was entitled to a summary judgment: 
A. As a matter of law, no binding contract existed 
between the parties in the form of the Earnest Money 
Receipt and Offer to Purchase. 
The argument of Respondent on the motion for 
summary judgment was- founded on the proposition that 
the Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase signed 
by Hummel and Dahl was not, in fact or law, a legally 
binding agreement. Hummel contends that the alleged 
contract was not complete upon its face, but that it was 
lacking a material element without which it could not 
be legally binding. 
The document in part provides: 
"Seller agrees to finish said home and premises in 
accordance with attached plans and specifications at 
his expense . . . '' 
Hummel contends that said document is not binding 
for the reason that, in fact, the plans and specifications 
so required by the alleged contract were never furnished 
by Dahl or attached to the document sued upon. The fact 
that plans were never furnished is pointed out by Dahl 
in the following testimony given at the taking of his 
deposition: 
"Q. (By Mr. Kirton) Do you know whether any plan 
of this property was ever submitted to Mr. Hum-
10 
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mel by anyone? We speak of two things here to-
day. We have spoken of plans and also spoken of 
specifications. I am now speaking about the plans. 
"A. (By Dahl) No. I don't believe there was ever a 
set of plans given to him. I don't believe I gave 
any to Mrs. Garner. I am almost sure I didn't, 
because I felt that to give a set of plans out with 
the home the way it had been changed, was a 
detriment rather than to have the home as it set, 
because no one could look at the plans and get the 
true picture and it was smalled than what it ended 
up with" (D. 48). 
Nor were plans and specifications ever attached to 
the Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase as re-
quired. This fact is acknowledged by Appellants. (See 
Appellants' Brief, page 25). 
The alleged contract sued upon said Seller would 
finish the home in accordance with attached plans and 
specifications. In fact, no plans and specifications were 
ever attached, and it is admitted no plans were ever fur-
nished, nor were any specifications furnished, and 
therefore the alleged contract is indefinite in its terms as 
to a material element and is not legally binding. 
In 12 Am. Jur. 554-555, Sec. 64, we find this statement 
of law: 
"An agreement to be binding must be definite and 
certain. It is evident that courts can neither specifically 
enforce agreements nor award substantial damages for 
their breach when they are wanting in certainty. Dam-
ages canont be measured for the breach of an obligation 
when the naL,'re nad extent of the obligation are un-
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In the case of Cannaday vs. Martin, Tex. Civ. App. 
98 S. W. 2nd 1009, at page 1012, the court said, quoting 
with approval Williston on Contract: 
"A promsie to erect buildings where the dimensions 
and plans are not specified, or which refers to plans 
as part of a contract though no plans and specifications 
are attached . . . are all to vague, and are not of suffi-
cient definiteness ... to be enforceable." 
See Williston on Contracts, 3rd Edition, Vol. I, pp. 
135-140, par. 42. Also, The Aimini Company v. Charles 
H. King, 92 Ill. App. 276. 
In the Washington case of Wildon et al. vs. Degnan, 
150 p. 1184, the court was asked to award liquidated 
damages on the breach of an alleged contract to form 
a corporation. The alleged contract provided for the 
purpose of the corporation the amount of the capital 
stock, and the proportion in which it was to be contributed. 
The court held the agreement not sufficiently definite 
in its terms to be binding. Among the reasons ascribed for 
this holding were that there was nothing in the agreement 
to bind a majority of the subscribers to the organization 
of the corporation under the laws of any certain state if 
they were unwilling or refused to consent thereto. 
Similarly, in the case before the court there is nothing 
in the alleged contract to bind either of the parties thereto 
as to what was to be done to complete the home. What, 
for example, could the court require Dahl to do in com-
pletion of the home as the alleged contract stands? 
Hummel would be helpless to compel Dahl to do any-
12 
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thing without an agreement before hand as to what Dahl 
would do. 
The Washington Court in the Wildon case treated 
this problem of definiteness by citation of the case of 
Rudiger vs. Coleman, 112 App. Div., 279, 89 N. Y. Supp. 
461. In that case, there was an agreement that: 
"A corporation shall be formed ... in accordance 
with a certificate and by-laws, a copy of which by-laws 
is hereto attached." 
The New York Court in an action brought on this agree-
ment stated: 
"The judgment cannot be sustained . . . annexed 
to the agreement there is a proposed set of by-laws, 
but they contain little if anything, showing the terms 
and details of the proposed incorporation. It follows 
that the judgment cannot be enforced if the parties 
refused to comply with it, and for that reason is ob-
jectionable in form and substance." 
This reasoning applies squarely to the case at bar. There 
is nothing in the Earnest Money Agreement '' . . . showing 
the terms and details" for completion of the home for which 
$75,000.00 was to be paid. It is unreasonable to suppose that 
a man would obligate himself to this extent without knowing 
what he was buying and this could not be known without 
specifications setting forth the agreement of the parties as 
to what each would do and what each could require of the 
other. 
The court in the Martin case concluded that: 
"The so-called contract is no more than an agree-
ment for an agreement, or, in other words, an agree-
13 
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ment to do something which requires a further meeting 
of the minds of the parties and without which it would 
not be complete." 
Respondent contends that this language accurately de-
scribes the document sued upon in the instant case, i.e.~ it is 
an agreement for an agreement. The alleged agreement re~ 
quired something to be done which was not in fact done, that 
is, to furnish and attach plans and specifications. The failure 
so to do made the alleged agreement nugatory and not legally 
binding. 
Appellants, in their first argument, contend that the lower 
court could not consider the legal sufficiency of the alleged 
contract. (Appellants' Brief, pp. 15-17). They contend that 
the question of whether ·the alleged agreement was binding 
on its face was not a part of the pre-trial order, therefore 
could not be entertained by the court. 
In meeting this argument, Respondent calls the attention 
of the court to the following facts as disclosed by the record. 
In all of his pleadings as set forth in the statement of 
facts, Respondent repeatedly contended that the alleged docu-
ment was not a· contract between the parties as a matter of 
law. In paragraph 7 of the original counterclaim, the Re-
spondent alleged that the Exhibit "A," attached to Plaintiffs' 
Complaint, shows upon its face that no agreement has ever 
been reached by the parties. In his answer to the cross-complaint, 
the Respondent set forth an entire affirmative defense to the 
effect that plans and specifications for the completion of the 
home and premises ever came about and there was no agree-
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Dahl and Hummel, at no time, had a meeting of the minds 
and no contract has ever been entered into by and between the 
parties. 
All parties thereafter filed their respective motions for 
summary judgment. The Appellants each earnestly urged the 
court that the alleged contract was a contract. as a matter of 
law and that no issue of fact remained for the court to consider, 
and that therefore each was entitled to a judgment as a matter 
of law in their favor. 
Likewise, it was the contention of the Respondent that 
the alleged contract on its face, and as a matter of law, was 
not a binding agreement between the parties. It was argued 
by the Appellants that the parol evidence rule would preclude 
the introduction of evidence on behalf of the Respondent 
concerning any misrepresentation as to the square foot area 
of the home or any understanding of the parties to the alleged 
contract, to the effect that no plans or specifications had been 
furnished to the parties. They controverted each and every 
argument advanced by the Respondent in support of his motion. 
They argued his motion before the trial court and they sub-
mitted written briefs with respect thereto. Nowhere in their 
oral argument or in their written briefs did they, at any time, 
contend to the court below that Respondent's motion for 
summary judgment was not and could not· be before the court 
below, for the reason that they have now assigned on appeal 
to the effect that it is outside of the framed issues of the pre-
trial order. The first time this matter has been brought to the 
~· attention of anyone in connection with these proceedings is 
~~ in the brief filed by the Appellants. At the pre-trial conference, 
15 
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each party stated his intention to the court to file a motion 
for summary judgment and asked the court to have the case 
set down for hearing in advance of the trial date, so that the 
motion of the respective parties could be fully heard, because 
if the court were to grant any one of the motions for summary 
judgment, this would obviate the necessity for trying the issues 
of fact set forth in the pre-trial order. 
If the Appellants had wished to contend that the legal suf-
ficiency of their alleged contract could not come before the 
court, the Appellants had ample opportunity to do so. Certainly 
if there had been any question at all regarding the matter, 
the Respondent would have had the right to ask the court for 
such modification of the pre-trial order as may be necessary to 
dead y include within it, the issue presented to the trial court 
by the Respondent in support of his motion for summary 
judgment. Appellant has cited Rule 16 of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. We likewise cite the rule to the court and 
add our own emphasis to the last portion of the rule. 
''The court shall make an order which recites the 
action taken at the conference, the amendments allowed 
to do the pleadings, and the agreements made by the 
parties as to any of the matters considered, and which 
limits the issues for trial to those not disposed of by 
admissions or agreements of counsel; and such order 
when entered controls the subsequent course of the 
action, unless modified at the trial to prevent manifest 
injustice." 
It is submitted that no unfair advantage has been taken of 
the Appellants. The issue of the legal sufficiency of the alleged 
contract was raised by the Respondent at every stage of the 
pleadings and at the pre-trial conference arrangements were ~ 
16 
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made to test the legal sufficiency of the documents on behalf 
of all parties. The Appellants had ample notice that the Re-
spondent was asking the court to pass upon the legal sufficiency 
of this doucment by its motion. Finally, if the Appellants 
wished to contend that the pre-trial order precluded any con-
sideration of the legal sufficiency of the document, they were 
under obligation to call this matter to the attention of the 
court below, because it would be in the discretion of the 
trial court to modify the pre-trial order to permit the Re-
spondent to bring the issue, which had existed from the be-
ginning of the action, squarely into the existing issues before 
the court. 
It is next contended at page 17 of Appellants' Brief that 
"no real issue is made of the fact that there were never any 
plans attached, because the home was 80 per cent complete and 
the plans with design of location of rooms and so forth would 
be superfluous (D, 9 and 10). It was the specifications on 
how Mr. Dahl proposed to complete the house which gave 
Mr. Hummel utmost concern." 
Were this argument to be accepted, it would be a direct 
violation of the parol evidence rule. An excellent statement of 
the law, in this regard, is found in 12 Am. Jur., Contracts, 
Sec. 234, page 757: 
"Parol Understandings, although they induce the 
making of a written contract, are merged in the writing 
so that they cannot be used to change the contract or 
show any intent different from that expressed in the 
instrument." 
In the case at bar, we have a situation where the clear and 
unambiguous terms of the contract require the providing and 
17 
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attaching of plans. It is an uncontroverted fact that plans 
were never provided, nor were they ever attached. A contention 
that they were not needed would vary the clear written pro-
vision of the alleged contract, which required that plans be 
provided. The statement that plans were not necessary, would 
require parol evidence, and parol evidence · · . . . cannot be 
used to change the contract, or show any intent different from 
that expressed in the instrument." 
A second and very significant observation on this argument 
propounded by Appellants, is that in all of the pleadings of 
the Appellants, the only alleged contract that has ever been 
pleaded, or made a matter of record, is the document marked 
Exhibit "A," attached to the Complaint and Cross-Complaint. 
This is the disputed Earnest Money receipt and offer to pur-
chase. The significant portion of the typed-in matter says: 
"Seller agrees to finish said home and premises in 
accordance with attached plans and specifications at 
his expense, on or before the 15th day of January, 
1959." 
Neither of the Appellants bothered to plead any plans 
or specifications. They admit that no plans have ever been 
furnished. The most that they contend is that the specifications 
were furnished that would satisfy the requirements of this 
instrument. These are the so-called specifications, marked Ex-
hibit "D-4," consisting of some 15 pagesof principally mimeo-
graphed materials prepared by Dahl. Both of the Appellants 
admit that there were many matters contained in the so-called 
specifications that were never discussed or considered by Hum-
mel, Dahl and Garner. In this connection, Respondent calls 
18 
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to the Court's attention questions and answers beginning at 
page 2 5 of the Deposition of Mrs. Garner. 
"Q. Mrs. Garner, I will just ask you a yes or no on this. 
Was it your understanding that the parties were 
going to finish the house in accordance with what 
appears the Exhibit 'D4'? 
"A. Yes. When I got the specifications, I did not sit 
down and read them item by item. I am not a 
building c~>ntractor. 
"Q. Of course these matters that are set forth in here 
had never been discussed in any detail between 
the parties at all, had they? 
"A. Well, you can't say it blanket. That is like saying 
that everybody is good or everybody is bad. Some 
of them had probably and some of them hadn't. 
"Q. Undoubtedly, some of them had not. Isn't that 
correct? 
(Mr. Nielsen speaking) You may answer if you know. 
"A. If I know, let me think, if I know. How much 
plaster went~ into the . plastering? How much sand 
that hadn't been discussed? 
"Q. (By Mr Kirton) Will you take such time as you 
will require to go over and examine the specifica-
tions, and tell me whether or not all the matters 
therein set forth had been discussed and agreed 
upon between Hummel and Dahl? 
"A. No, they had not all. 
"Q. Let me say this. The matter that Mr. Dahl sat and 
embodied in this detailed specification here, there 
had been no prior meeting between Mr. Hummel 
and Mr. Dahl to discuss these matters, had there? 
"A. Not all of them." 
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It will be seen from the excerpt that matters were con-
tained in the so-called specifications which had never been 
discussed between the parties. It would seem obvious that 
specifications which had never been discussed by the parties 
could not satisfy the requirements of the alleged contract. 
At most, they were mimeographed forms, hurriedly filled out 
by Dahl. To impose them upon Hummel in this condition, be-
fore the parties had had any discussion concerning them, would 
be a strained and unjustified interpretation of the documents 
and of the purpose which they allegedly filled. 
It is next contended that nothing is said in the Earnest 
Money Agreement to the effect that the specifications to be 
furnished were subject to the approval of Mr. Hummel ( Ap-
pellants' Brief, p. 25). They say that to permit Hummel by 
means of oral testimony to so contend would be in direct 
violation of that term of the agreement, which they quote as 
follows: 
"It is understood and agreed that the terms written 
in this receipt, constitute the entire preliminary contract 
between the purchaser and seller and that no verbal 
statement made by anyone, relative to this transaction 
shall be construed to be a part of this transaction, 
unless incorporated in writing, herein." 
Concerning the proposition urged upon the court that 
the specifications to be submitted were not subject to any 
approval by Hummel, the Appellants are urging upon the 
Court a dilemma having two horns, neither of which can bt 
sustained. 
The first of these is that the so-called unsigned specifica-
tions were simply a written embodiment of an agreement 
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already reached between the parties. It has been previously 
shown that this is not the case; that there were many matters 
embodied in the so-called specifications which had never been 
discussed or considered by the parties. It is untenable to assert 
that the so-called unsigned specifications were simply the 
written embodiment of agreement already reached by the 
parties. 
The other horn of the dilemma is that the alleged contract 
is to be construed to the effect that it was entirely within the 
discretion of Dahl as to what the specifications should contain 
and how the house was to be finished. 
It is submitted that to so construe the instrument, would 
be for the court to make the contract for the parties, to impose 
new additional terms that the parties had never discussed or 
agreed upon. Either position is wholly untenable under the law. 
However, much more significant than any of the fore-
going argument, is the parol evidence rule, cited and discussed 
by Respondent elsewhere in this brief (p ? ? ) . Counsel for 
Appellants have cited the parol evidence rule in support of 
their own argument and have called the court's attention to 
case handed down by the Tenth Circuit (Nephi Processing 
Plant vs. Talbot, 247, Federal 2nd, 771). As Appellants point 
out, a provision of the contract provided that the individual 
should transport his turkeys to the plant and the individual 
contended that he had orally discussed this provision of the 
contract with the representative of the processor and was told 
that the processing plant paid all but a very nominal portion 
of the transportation costs. The Tenth Circuit then held that 
this testimony was inconsistent with the provisions of the 
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written agreement of the parties. That by unambiguous terms, 
in the written instrument, Talbots agreed to deliver the tur-
keys to the processor at Nephi, Utah. The Court held that 
the terms of such a contract cannot be altered, varied or con-
tradicted by parol evidence. 
We are satisfied that this is a proper statement of the 
parol evidence rule, but in citing this rule and urging it upon 
the Court, how can the Appellants be heard to say that parol 
evidence may be introduced to prove that the plans and speci-
fications called for in the writing they have sued upon were 
not necessary, and that this provision of the written instrument 
1s, therefore, to be disregarded by the Court? 
We think the statement of the parol evidence ruled by 
Professor Ronan E. Degnan, cited by Appellants, is particularly 
applicable to the case at bar. We here take the liberty of re-
stating his reasoning. 
"This final agreement is the agreement of the parties; 
it is the jural act to which the law attributes changes 
in legal relationships. In short, the later agreement 
supersedes all former. Thus former negotiations or even 
agreements are excluded from a trial not because evi-
dence as to their existence would be untrustworthy but 
because they are legally immaterial; if their existence 
were proved or even admitted it would not affect the 
rules of law to be applied in determining the disposi-
tion of the case." 
Any evidence questionine the requirement of written plans 
and specifications to be attached to the alleged contract would .,. 
be legally immaterial, as stated by Professor Degnan, for the ~ 
reason that the alleged contract supersedes any oral evidence 
to the contrary. 
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Appellant further contends that Hummel is precluded from 
denying the validity of the document sued upon because his 
signature appears under line 46 of Exhibit "D-3," which reads: 
"I acknowledge receipt of a final copy of the fore-
going agreement bearing all signatures." (Appellant's 
Brief, pp. 27, 28, 29). 
Line 45 of the same document provides that "(State law 
requires brokers to furnish copies of the contract bearing all 
signatures to Buyer and Seller . . . ) ". This requirement is in-
serted for the purpose of preventing fraud and misdealing. 
It gives the Buyer and Seller a copy of the instrument with 
all signatures which cannot then be unilaterally altered. The 
satisfying of this requirement in no wise indicates the complete-
ness of a contract or the satisfaction of requirements set forth 
in the documents. It merely indicates that the document itself 
has been received by the parties. 
Secondly, the document of which receipt of a copy was 
acknowledged by Hummel, shows on its face that it was not 
complete. Hummel actually acknowledged " . . . receipt of a 
final copy of the foregoing agreement," which at most is "an 
agreement to agree." 
B. Any issue of fact between the parties as to whether 
there was a misrepresentation in connection with the purported 
agreement is not before this court because no binding contract 
existed between the parties as a matter of law. 
Appellants, at page 30 of their Brief, quote the following 
paragraphs from the lower court's pre-trial order: 
"1. As an issue of law, may the Defendant Hummel 
obtain recision on the ground of misrepresentations 
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being made in connection with the square footage of 
said home. 
"2. In the event said Defendants may raise such 
issue, an issue of fact will be whether such misrepre-
sentations were made as to justify recision of the con-
tract" (R. 27}. 
They argue that these issues precluded the trial court from 
entering a summary judgment in favor of Respondent. 
A cursory examination of the quotations reveals the fallacy 
of Appellants' argument. The issues framed by the pre-trial 
order gave certain rights to Respondent in the event the writing 
sued upon was valid on its face. If the Court on the motion 
for summary judgment had ruled that the writing was valid 
on its face, a judgment for Appellants could not have been 
awarded for the reason that Respondent still had the right, 
as evidenced by the pre-trial order, to try the issue of fact as 
to whether there were other grounds upon which the contract 
could be rescinded. This was a right of Respondent, not a right 
of Appellants. Appellants do not contend there is an issue of 
fact as to whether the alleged contract is binding. It is Re-
spondent who makes this contention. Appellant cannot be heard 
to say that the court could not award a summary judgment 
to Respondent because the issues raised by Rsepondent had 
not been adjudicated. 
Appellants raised no issue of fact. Their contention was 
that the alleged agreement was binding per se. When the 
court determined that the document sued upon was not binding 
on its face, Appellants had received an adjudication of their 
contention and they cannot now be heard to say that they 
have an issue which hasn't been determined. 
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Secondly, it will be noted that a reading of the pre-trial 
order that it is based on the assumption that the document 
sued upon was valid upon its face. For example, paragraph 1 
speaks of obtaining recision; paragraph 2 speaks of misrepre-
sentation as grounds for recision, etc. 
Each paragraph assumes the agreement to be valid on its 
face, theri sets up an issue as to whether there are other grounds 
upon which it could be declared not binding. 
As pointed out hereinabove, Appellants recognized that 
the legal sufficiency of the documents sued upon could be tested 
on a Motion for Summary Judgment, and, in fact, counsel made 
their own motion. The court, upon hearing the motion, de-
termined that the alleged agreement was not binding on its 
face, since it was lacking in a material element thereon. This 
decision made it unnecessary to proceed to a trial of the issues 
framed at the pre-trial conference. 
Only if the court had determined that the contract was 
binding on its face could issues have been raised as to whether 
Hummel could avoid the language thereof by attacking it 
collaterally with the argument that it was induced by mis-
representation. 
Respondents agree with the Appellants' statement at page 
30 of their Brief that "a summary judgment may be granted 
when there is no dispute of facts and the matter is clear to 
the court that judgment should be granted in accordance with · 
relief prayed for ... " This principal applies squarely to the 
case now before the court. There was no issue of fact between 
the parties at the hearing on the Motion for Summary Judg-
ment as to whether or not plans and specifications were fur-
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nished and attached to the document sued upon. That they had 
not is admitted by Appellants in their Brief at page 25. When 
the court heard the argument and determined that there was 
no issue of fact as to whether or not the plans and specifica-
tions were provided and attached, as required by the alleged 
agreement, it declared said document invalid as a matter of 
law. The court did not concern itself with the question of 
misrepresentation or with the conditions under which misrep-
resentation would constitute a defense to an action of this 
nature. The reason for this was that these issues were not before 
the· court on a Motion for Summary Judgment. 
C. There is no question of fact to be determined as to 
whether a binding contract between the parties existed. 
Was the document sued upon binding on its face? Re-
spondent contends that it was not and this was the judgment 
of the court below. 
Inasmuch as the Court below determined that the document ~· 
was not binding on its fact, the question of whether it could 
be rescinded because of misrepresentation, etc., became moot. 
Furthermore, the court's attention is again called to the 
fact that if the document sued on had been adjudged a contract 
by the court below, Respondent would have been the one with 
the right to thereafter raise issues as to whether it could be 
attacked collaterally. In other words, it is Respondent who has 
the right to raise an issue of fact and Appellants cannot claim 
that the court erred because they did not determine a right 
which belonged, not to them, but to Respondent. Clearly, 
Appellants are basing their contention on the argument that 
the judgment cannot be sustained until all of Respondent's 
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rights are determined and they would have the court try issues 
which they have never contended exist. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, Respondent respectfully requests the Court 
to affirm the decision of the Honorable Stewart M. Hanson in 
awarding a Summary Judgment for the reasons and upon the 
ground that there is no contract between the parties as a matter 
of law; the purported contract being too indefinite in its terms 
to be enforced. 
Further, that the validity of the alleged contract, as a 
matter of law, was proper for the Court to determine on a 
motion for Summary Judgment, and that the lower court's 
determination, that there was no contract between the parties, 
as a matter of law, precluded the necessity of trying the issues 
framed by the Court in th pre-trial order. 
Respectfully submitted, 
W. W. KIRTON, JR. and 
VERDEN E. BETTIL YON 
of Kirton and Betti! yon 
Attorneys for Defendants and Respondent 
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